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Non-Technical Summary
Do public R&D subsidies stimulate or simply crowd out private investment?
The economic literature concerning external effects indicates that innovations
suffer from market failure. Innovation projects with high social returns may
not be implemented, because the induced private benefits do not exceed the
private costs. The rationale of public R&D funding is to reduce private costs and
therefore raise the investment in the R&D projects and the number of conducted
R&D projects. However there is an incentive for all firms to apply for public
funding, even for those who could perform their innovation activities using their
own funds. Thus, the impact of the public R&D funding is questionable.
The focus of this paper is on the direct funding of R&D projects in the German
manufacturing sector granted by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research
(BMBF). This study applies parametric and semiparametric two-step selection
models. Selection models treat the receipt of public R&D funding as endoge-
neous and include a selection correction for this non-random selection process,
in the structural equation on the firms’ R&D expenditure. In a first step, firms’
probability of receiving public R&D funding is estimated and in a second step,
the effect of the public funds on firms’ R&D expenditure is considered. Selection
models control for unobservable characteristics entering both the selection and
the structural part of the model.
The parametric two-step Heckman model serves as a benchmark. Alterna-
tively, a dummy variables estimator (Cosslett, 1991), a series estimator (Newey,
1999) and Robinson’s (1988) estimator as a partial linear model are applied.
Semiparametric estimators identify only the slope parameters of the structural
equation. Hence, an additional estimator for the intercept is needed to identify
the treatment effects. This study uses the intercept estimators developed by
Heckman (1990) and Andrews and Schafgans (1998).
In line with previous studies, the finding is that R&D subsidies have a positive
effect on firms’ R&D expenditure for all estimated models. However, it also
outlines that the level of the “average treatment effect on the treated“ varies
with the different assumptions of the applied selection model.
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This paper analyzes the effects of public R&D subsidies on R&D expen-
diture in the German manufacturing sector. The focus is on the question
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1 Introduction
Since the 1950s, the German Federal Government fosters R&D activities in
the business and science sector to route technological progression, to raise na-
tional competitiveness and to increase social wealth. In 2002, the total R&D
expenditure was about ¿ 50.1 billion Euro in Germany, where about 68% were
spent by the business sector. The German Federal Government and the Fed-
eral States (
”
La¨nder“) spent 32% of the total amount to strengthen this process
by investing in R&D. The public R&D project funding (with a total amount of
¿ 4137.8 millon) is a major part of the public R&D expenditure and ¿ 3813.5
million are dedicated to the direct R&D project funds. This kind of R&D funding
is focused on in this paper.2
Economic literature concerning external effects provides justification to the
question why R&D projects are funded: Innovation projects lead to market fail-
ure. They are assumed to have positive external effects. However from the firms’
view, they are only worth being implemented when they promise private bene-
fits. Hence, a lot of potential R&D projects may generate social benefits, but
do not cover private costs, and as a consequence, would not be conducted by
privately owned firms that seek to maximize profits.3 This is the state’s rationale
for market intervention intending to expand the innovation volume up to the
social optimum by lowering the private costs of R&D projects. However, public
R&D programmes establish an incentive for every firm to apply for funding, even
if the firm could perform the innovation project using its own resources. Thus,
the question arises whether public R&D funding supports or simply crowds out
firms’ privately financed innovation activities.
Evaluation studies in the context of industrial economics are relatively rare in
comparison to the labor market economics. Klette et al. (2000) give a survey of
microeconometric studies focusing on different effects like crowding out, growth,
patenting etc. David et al. (2000) provide a survey focusing on studies analyzing
R&D input measures on different aggregation levels. They find that few of the
considered studies (2 of 14) yield a substitute relationship of public and private
R&D investment on the macro level. Considering studies at the firm level, nearly
half of the surveyed studies (9 of 19) conclude with crowding out effects.
Methodically there are different approaches. Blundell and Costa Dias (2000)
give a review of evaluation methods for non-experimental data, namely matching
and selection methods.4 Arvanitis (2002) presents a non-technical summary of
the state of the art in industrial economics for firm level data. He focuses on one-
and two-equation frameworks considering direct and indirect effects of selection.
2Statistics in this section are taken from the Faktenbericht Forschung 2002. The last two
numbers are set points.
3In addition to the spillover argument, there are further economic rationals like financial
constraints that arise from asymmetric information and the indivisibilities of R&D projects.
4They also consider the IV and difference-in-difference method.
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He considers cross-sectional and panel data. His conclusion is that an evaluator
should use more than one evaluation strategy to overcome the shortcomings of
the particular methods.
Recent studies applying matching methods are Almus and Czarnitzki (2003)
and Czarnitzki and Fier (2002, 2003). This method bases on direct comparison of
publicly funded firms and their nonfunded counterparts. Simultaneous equation
models are used by Wallsten (2000), Arvanitis et al. (2002)and Gonza´lez et al.
(2003). Busom (2000) uses parametric selection models. Her paper is most similar
to this study. She focuses on a non-representative subsample of 154 Spanish firms
stemming from a sample of firms that received public R&D funding from the
“Centro para el Desarrollo Tecnolo´gico e Industrial“ (CDTI) in 1988 and uses
Heckman’s (1974, 1976, 1979) sample selection models. Concerning the effects
of participation in R&D programs her findings are heterogenous: for some firms
(30%) full crowding out effects can not be ruled out, whereas for the whole sample,
on average, public funding stimulates private innovative activities.
In addition to the parametric two-step selection model, this study applies
semi-parametric selection models to evaluate the effect of public R&D fund-
ing. The econometric methods are two-step selection models, namely Heckman’s
(1974, 1976) parametric model and the semi-parametric estimators provided by
Newey (1999), Cosslett (1991) and Robinson (1988). Semi-parametric models
usually identify the slope parameters only. Thus, additional intercept estimators
are needed. The applied intercept estimators are Heckman (1990) and Andrews
and Schafgans (1998).
Selection models treat the receipt of public R&D funding as endogeneous by
using a first-step estimation on the probability to receive subsidies. Furthermore,
selection models control for unobservable characteristics entering the first- and
second-step equation. This study provides a comparison of the estimators exem-
plifying the question of the effects of public R&D funding. The outline of the
paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the underlying data base. In Section 3,
the applied estimators are described. Section 4 presents the empirical results and
section 5 gives a summary and conclusions.
2 Data and Empirical Considerations
The underlying database is a merge of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)
providing information on innovative behavior of firms at the firm level and the
database from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). In-
formation on receiving of direct R&D project funding are replenished from the
BMBF database. A comparison of these data sources makes it possible to ex-
clude firms that received R&D funding from another sponsor (like the Federal
States (“La¨nder“) or the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (BMWA))
from the control group. Patent information is taken from the database of the
German Patent and Trade Mark Office. In addition, a credit rating index from
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the database of the German credit rating agency CREDITREFORM is used. The
resulting sample consists of 3,744 observations of innovative firms in the manufac-
turing sector5 in the years 1992-2000, 723 of which received public R&D funding
from the BMBF. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables:
R&D expenditure: This variable measures the firms’ R&D investment less
the amount granted by direct R&D project funding. The so-called net R&D ex-
penditure is the endogeneous variable in the structural equation on R&D input.
Table 1 shows a large difference in means (¿ 41.34 million vs. ¿ 2.06 million) and
standard deviations (¿ 224.75 million vs. ¿ 21.77 million) of the R&D expendi-
ture of funded and nonfunded firms. For this reason, I a logarithmic specification
in the equation considering R&D expenditure is chosen. Using logs avoids that
estimations depend too much on a few large observations of R&D expenditure.
The funded firms have a mean value of ¿ 0.24 million in logarithms of R&D
expenditure and nonfunded firms have a mean value of ¿ -1.65 million.
Firm size: The number of employees accounts for size effects. On average, the
funded firms in the present sample are much larger (mean: 3,600.52 employees)
than the nonfunded firms (mean: 507.00 employees). The hypothesis about the
relationship of firm size and innovation activities traces back to Schumpeter’s find-
ing that innovation activities rise disproportionately with increasing firm size.6
This hypothesis is supported by many arguments. Following Cohen (1995) one
has to name the imperfectness of capital markets that are more likely to be van-
quished by larger firms, because of the assumed correlation between size and
internal financial resources and their stability. Furthermore, larger firms benefit
from economies of scale and economies of scope. Another argument aims at the
complementarity of R&D and other departments that are considered to be better
organized and thereby more productive in larger firms.
In the probit model, firm size is measured as the total number of employees
divided by 1,000 and the square of this term to allow for sufficient index variation.
To take the expected disproportionately effect of the firm size into account, in
the structural models firm size is measured by the logarithm of the total number
of employees and the square.
Market stucture: The second neo-Schumpeterian hypothesis concerning the
market structure is taken into consideration by including the market share of
the firms, i.e. the ratio of the firm’s sales and the total sales of the appurtenant
industry on a 3-digit NACE level:7
sharei, j =
salesi, j
n∑
i=1
salesi, j
· 100.
5The exact sector differentiation is shown in Table 3 in appendix A.
6See e.g. Schumpeter (1942), Galbraith (1952) or Scherer (1965).
7This variable should not be a source of serious endogeneity in the structutal equations. If
there is an impact of the market share on the R&D expenditure it is more likely to affect in
the following periods.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
funded firms nonfunded firms
variable mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
R&D expenditure 41.34 224.75 2.06 21.77
log(R&D expenditure) 0.24 2.38 -1.65 2.02
employees 3,600.52 15,928.09 507.00 1,954.43
market share 3.51 21.74 0.46 1.95
patent stock per employee 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.06
age 41.91 43.20 41.80 41.33
(credit rating)q1 233.49 32.67 230.64 56.84
(credit rating)q2 250.51 82.53 223.64 64.73
(credit rating)q3 227.83 64.50 202.37 64.59
(credit rating)q4 203.95 57.46 186.60 45.18
(credit rating)q5 183.92 61.28 186.04 51.33
R&D department 0.83 0.37 0.63 0.48
capital company 0.97 0.17 0.93 0.25
foreign parent company 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.28
export intensity 0.34 0.26 0.25 0.23
export dummy 0.95 0.22 0.89 0.31
east 0.30 0.46 0.14 0.35
1992 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.37
1993 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34
1994 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.35
1995 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30
1996 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.34
1997 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17
1998 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.30
1999 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30
2000 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.29
ind1 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.19
ind2 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.18
ind3 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.30
ind4 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30
ind5 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.28
ind6 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19
ind7 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.16
ind8 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.32
ind9 0.31 0.46 0.24 0.43
ind10 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.25
ind11 0.09 0.29 0.03 0.18
ind12 0.17 0.37 0.07 0.26
ind13 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20
ind14 0.06 0.24 0.01 0.10
number of observations 723 3021
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i denotes the firms, j the industries. The average market share of funded firms
(3.51%) is much larger than for nonfunded firms (0.46%).
Previous innovativion activities : If one assumes a “Pick-the-winner“ strategy
tracked by the state in allocating the public R&D funds, the probability of the re-
ceipt of public R&D funding is affected by the existing R&D staff and equipment
and the innovative history of the firm. An own R&D department is measured
by a dummy variable. The innovative background is approximated by the patent
stock per employee and its squared value. The patent stock is computed as the
time series of the patent applications with a 15% depreciation rate of knowledge
assets:8
patent stocki,t = patent stocki,t−1 · 85% + patentsi,t.
To avoid endogeneity, the patent stock is used with a one-year lag.
Solvency : In Germany for most R&D funding programs, the amount of R&D
granting is individually ascertained as a certain share of the total costs of the
R&D project. Firms with a better solvency are supposed to be less likely to
apply for financial support because they have better chances to gain external
funds. In addition, publicR&D project funding targets for projects, that would
not have been conducted otherwise. Thus, it is suspected that firms with a bad
solvency situation are more likely to receive public funding.
To implement the solvency, a credit rating index indicates the worthiness
of credit in the range from 100 to 600, whereby 100 is the best and 600 the
worst solvency situation. To take size effects into account the credit rating is
separatly included for five size groups k = 1, ..., 5 according to the quintiles of
the distribution of the number of employees:
(cred.rat.i)qk =
{
cred.rat.i/1000 , if quintile=k
0 , otherwise
The average credit rating index is lower with increasing firm size for both funded
and nonfunded firms.
Foreign parent company : Moreover it is distinguished between firms with a
parent company and such that are not part of a network of subsidiaries. Firms
in networks of subsidiaries are again distinguishable in those with a foreign and
those with a parent company in Germany. Taking into account that the parent
company typically is responsible for the application for public R&D funding and
that some public funding programs are not addressed to foreign companies it can
be expected that firms with a foreign parent company are more likely to apply
for and receive public R&D funding in the parent company’s home country.
Legal form: This study distinguishes firms with liability limiting legal form
(joint stock companies (“AGs“), non-public limited liability firms
(“GmbHs“) and commercial partnerships with non-public limited liability firm
8See Czarnitzki and Fier (2003) and Hall (1990) for details.
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(“GmbH & Co.KGs“)) from partnerships and other existing legal forms. Firms
with limited liability are supposed to have a better internal organization struc-
ture. Due to the journalization of the firms’ business information in the German
trade register, the uncertainty about investments in firms with limited liability
for potential investors is reduced. So, if the state wants to pick the “winners“
firms with limited liability are suspected to be more likely to receive public R&D
funding.
Export activity : The need for capacity to compete internationally is suspected
to be a stimulus of innovative behavior. Furthermore, one goal of the German
R&D project funding programmes is to strengthen the competitiveness of Ger-
man firms in international comparison. Thus, export activities are suspected to
be a signal for the allocation decision of the public R&D funds. From Table 1 it
can be seen that there are more exporting firms in the group of the funded firms
and that those group face a higher export intensity.
In the probit model of the receipt of public funding the export intensity is
used as regressor. To reduce collinearity, in the structural equation an export
dummy is used instead.
Eastern Germany : Firm loaction in Eastern Germany is controlled by a
dummy variable, because the supply of public R&D funding is higher for Eastern
German firms because government wants to foster the transformation process of
the Eastern german economy. Table 1 shows that there are more funded firms in
Eastern Germany: 30% of the Eastern German firms in the sample receive public
R&D funding, twice as much as in West Germany.
Firms’ age (measured in years) is incorporated and industry differences and
intertemporal effects are controlled by sets of dummy variables.
3 Two-Step-Selection Models
Considering evaluation problems, the observed population appears decom-
posed into subgroups, in this study: publicly funded and nonfunded firms. The
subgroups are typically not randomly emerged, but are the result of an under-
lying selection process. In the case of evaluation problems, statements for the
counterfactual situation are necessary to draw results. The counterfactual situa-
tion is the value of an outcome variable in the unobservable case, when a funded
individual would not have been funded. Thus the analysis of a single subgroup is
not sufficient. Evaluation problems call for econometric methods, that take the
subgroups structure of the population sensitively into account. Selection models
provide one appropriate evaluation method.
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The Selection model
Observed firms are unambiguously distinguishable in recipients and non-receivers
of public R&D funds. Furthermore, a relationship for the regressors X and the
endogenous, continuous variable Y is assumed for both categories:
Y ∗i1 = fk(Xi) + εik with E[εik|Xi] = 0, k = {1, 0}. (1)
The functions f1 and f0 are the unknown relationships for Y
∗
i1 and Y
∗
i0 and Xi.
The asterik labels potential or latent variables, i.e. only one of the outcomes Y ∗i1
and Y ∗i0 is observed as Yi depending on the category the individual i has been
selected into. εik absorbs unobserved characteristics that are not included in the
structural relationship. Furthermore, there is a discrete variable di ∈ {1, 0} to
describe the participation status of each individual i. Only Yi = Y
∗
ik is observable:
Yi =
∑1
k=0 Y
∗
ik · I(di = k). A selection problem arises as a problem of missing
variables, because there are limited observations for the true relationship fk.
9
Thus, the conditional mean of Y is:
E[Y ∗ik|Xi, di = k] = fk(Xi) + E[εik|Xi, di = k]. (2)
Note that OLS does not provide a consistent estimator for this model ignoring
E[εik|Xi, di = k]. Thus, a selection correction ϕik is needed. The selection
mechanism is: di = S(Zi, ui), with S being a selection function, Zi are variables
with an impact on the selection decision and ui is an error term. Instead of Zi a
single index function θ depending on Zi is used:
Y ∗ik = fk(Xi) + ϕik(θ(Zi)) + ξik (3)
di = S(θ(Zi), ui) ∈ {1, 0}
Yi = di · Y ∗ik,
with E[ξik|Xi, di = k] = 0, ξik = εik − ϕik and Yi, di, Xi and Zi observable for
each i.
Parametric Model
The first considered approach is Heckman’s (1976, 1979) two-step model. First,
there is an equation on the receipt of public R&D funding and, second, there
is an outcome equation containing a selection correction term derived from the
first equation. Model parameters are specified as follows: f(·) and θ(·) are linear
functions, ϕ(·) is an indicator, the error terms are bivariate normal distributed
and are considered to be independent of the regressors. The model is:
Yi1 = X
′
i1β1 + εi1 (4)
Yi0 = X
′
i0β0 + εi0
9See Heckman (1974, 1976).
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di = I(Z
′
iγ + ui > 0)
(εi1, εi0, ui) ∼ N
0,
 σ
2
ε1
σε1ε0 σε1u
. σ2ε0 σε0u
. . 1

 .
Normalizing unobserved σ2u to 1 , (4) simplifies for identification purpose to:
Yi1 = X
′
i1β1 + σεuλi1(Z
′
iγ) + ξi1 (5)
Yi0 = X
′
i0β0 + σεuλi0(Z
′
iγ) + ξi0 (6)
di = I(Z
′
iγ + ui > 0).
λ(·) is the inverse Mill’s Ratio, given by the bivariate normal distribution of εi1,
respectively εi0, and ui:
λi1(Z
′
iγ) =
φ(Z ′iγ)
Φ(Z ′iγ)
(7)
λi0(Z
′
iγ) = −
φ(Z ′iγ)
1− Φ(Z ′iγ)
.
φ(·) is the density function and Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of
the standard normal distribution N(0, 1).
The main advantages of parametric estimators are
√
n-consistence, consis-
tency and an easy computational implementation. Furthermore, they are more
efficient than semiparametric estimators, yielding a more exact estimator pro-
vided that the model specification is correct. However, if f(·), θ(·) or the common
distribution of the error terms is not correctly specified, these estimators become
inconsistent. Another problem is the idiosyncratic character of the Mill’s Ratio,
that is nonlinear in theory, but in applications or simulations it often turns out
as an approximations of a linear function.10 In further applications, there is often
evidence for a strong correlation of λ(Z ′iγ) and X
′
iβ, especially if Z = X. If there
is only moderate variance of the index values Z ′iγ, estimated coefficients β will
show large standard errors. Thus an identification problem exists. To conclude,
the advantage of the parametric estimators that they do not rely on the exclusion
restrictions in theory, turns out to be a weak one in application.11
Semiparametric Models
The disadvantages of the parametric approach ranging from inconsistency of the
estimated coefficients in the presence of misspecification of the functional form or
of the error terms’ distribution to the weak identification power of the Mill’s Ra-
tio lead to non-parametric and semi-parametric models. Non-parameric models
provide a slower rate of convergence. They are difficult to interprete, especially
10See Leung and Yu (1996) and Nawata (1993).
11See Puhani (2000) for an analysis of the usefullness of Heckman’s (1976, 1979) estimator.
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when the results do not support economic theory, and out-of-sample predictions
are not possible. Therefore, the choice of semiparametric estimators seems to
be appropriate. At the interface of the parametric and nonparametric approach,
semiparametric estimation has advantages and disadvantages from both. Ad-
mitting less space for specification errors, it is possible to get consistent esti-
mates under weaker restrictions. Parametric components are still sensitive to
specification errors, but at the same time offer an easier interpretation of the
ex-ante chosen form of the model. Furthermore, semiparametric estimators nor-
mally reach
√
n-consistency, but still do not overcome parametric estimates in
efficiency, if the model is specified correctly. Semiparametric selection models
generally imply a two-step approach with estimators in each step being separate
constructions.12 Normally, they use the single index assumption13 mapping ob-
servations in a smaller range by reducing their dimension and aggregating the
information in θ(·). The single index assumption is not necessary for identifi-
cation, but improves estimators’ accuracy significantly. Besides the single index
restriction, each estimator imposes specific restrictions.
The applied semiparametric models allow the estimation of more complex
models under general moment and smoothing assumptions. Usually, in semi-
parametric models f(·) and θ(·) are specified parametrically whereas the selec-
tion correction term ϕ(·) is flexible. Thus, model (3) still holds. Therewith, an
easy and reasonable interpretation of the coefficients and a flexible form of the
selection correction is possible at the same time.
Cosslett’s Dummy Variables Estimator
Cosslett’s (1991) estimator uses a dummy variables selection correction. There-
fore, the value-ordered index Z ′iγ is cut in M sections. This provides a step
function, that approximates the normal distribution of the index. For each sec-
tion, a dummy is defined and included into the structural equation. The selection
correction term in (3) can be written as:14
ϕ(θ(Z ′iγ)) =
M∑
m=1
bmDim(Z
′
iγ). (8)
Cosslett (1991) shows that his estimator is consistent. But the estimated co-
efficients are not asymptotically normally distributed. However, this estimator is
easy to implement and good to interpret because of the descriptive figure of the
selection correction.
12With respect to the second step estimator’s properties, their combination should be chosen
carefully (McFadden and Newey (1994)).
13See Manski (1989, 1993).
14This application uses a heuristically chosen number of 10 dummies with the same number
of observations in each interval.
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Newey’s Series Estimator
Based on Lee (1982)15 and Cosslett (1991), Newey develops further single index
based estimators. In this paper the so-called series estimator16 is applied.
Similar to Cosslett’s dummy variables estimator this one aims at replacing
ϕ(θ(Z ′iγ)) by a consistent approximation. Newey chooses a sum of functions:
ϕ(·) ≈
K∑
k=1
ηk · pk(·), (9)
with ηk the unknown functions and pk(·) the known, smoothed lead terms that are
only dependent on θ. With a consistent estimate of γ in a first step, θ(Z ′iγ) can
be calculated consistently and, thereby, the series approximation
∑K
k=1 ηk · pk(·).
Assuming (9), the structural equation in (3) can be replaced by:
Yi = X
′
iβ +
K∑
k=1
ηk · pk(Z ′iγ) + ξ′i with ξ′i =
∞∑
k=K+1
ηk · pk(Z ′iγ) + ξi. (10)
After inserting estimates for pi(Z
′
iγ), the unknown parameters can be estimated
by a simple OLS regression. The approximating function for pk(·) is: pk(Z ′iγ) =
[τ(Z ′iγ)]
k−1. By using a polynomial series like this, there are no restrictions on
the functional form of the selection correction. τ(·) contains a lead term, that
can be defined in many ways: for example, it is the index itself, the normal
distribution or the inverse Mill’s Ratio. To avoid multicollinearity, τ(·) should
be replaced by corresponding polynomials, that are orthogonal. From this point
of view, this estimator can be seen as an extension of the Heckman model, that
allows for a flexible form of the selection correction by including the polynomials
of the Mill’s Ratio. This study uses the normal distribution as lead term and
specifies τ(·) according to Newey (1999).17 Doing so, τ(Z ′iγ) = 2Φ(Z ′iγ)−1 results
as a monotone, uniformly bounded function, in between -1 and 1. Uniformly
boundedness leads to a greater robustness regarding outliers.18
Newey (1999) shows his estimator to be
√
n-consistent and normally dis-
tributed. The optimal number of series terms is chosen heuristically by a com-
parison of the error terms of the estimated models.
Figure 1 shows the selection correction terms for the subsample of the funded
firms. Looking at the left end of the Mills’ Ratio, it is apparent, that there is the
largest selection correction for the nonfunded firms. For firms that receive public
15Lee (1982) replaces the density function of the error terms by an Edgeworth-approximation
based on a bivariate normal distribution.
16See Newey (1999).
17Newey (1999) suggests the following modification: Using τ̂min = mindi=1τ(θ(·)) and τ̂max =
maxdi=1τ(θ(·)), τk−1 can be replaced by a polynomial of k-th order, that is orthogonal for a
uniform interval [-1,1]: τ̂i =
2τ(θ̂(·))−τ̂min−τ̂max
τ̂min−τ̂max
.
18Linear transformations like this do not effect the estimates.
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Figure 1: Selection correction terms: funded firms
R&D funding with a probability of nearly one, the selection correction is nearly
zero. This property identifies the intercept of the model.
Cosslett’s selection correction complies with the normal distibution of the es-
timated index. The different cuts are presented in the figure. But remember that
each step corresponds to a binary variable in the regression model. Compared
to the Heckman model, this approach is flexible, because there is no functional
form for all observations assumed.
Newey’s selection correction has two terms in the recent application. The
first term corrects for firms that are funded with a probability of nearly one and
for those that are funded with a probability of nearly zero. The correction for
firms with propensity scores in between is small. Thus, the first selection cor-
rection term accounts for the observations at the edges of the propensity score.
The second, squared selection correction term corrects for the observations with
middle-valued propensity score. For observations at the edge of the propensity
score it converges to one. For those in between, there is a smaller selection correc-
tion that even reaches zero. Using two selection correction terms, that corrects
for different observations, is flexible in comparison to the Heckman model. How-
ever, the intercept is not identified in this model. Thus, an additional intercept
estimator is needed.
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Robinson’s Estimator as a Partial Linear Model
Contrary to the preceding estimators, Robinson’s (1988) estimator does not use a
single index restriction, but rests on the stronger assumption of independence of
error terms and regressors.19 Robinson’s approach is to subtract the statistically
derived expectation values from the observations in the structural equation of (3)
in order to eliminate the selection correction term:
E[Yi|Z ′iγ] = E[Xi|Z ′iγ]′β + E[ϕ(Z ′iγ)|Ziγ] + E[ξi|Z ′iγ] (11)
= E[Xi|Z ′iγ]′β + ϕ(Z ′iγ) + 0
=⇒ (Yi − E[Yi|Z ′iγ]) = (Xi − E[Xi|Z ′iγ])′β + ξ′i. (12)
By inserting the estimated conditioned expectations Ê[Yi|Z ′iγ] and Ê[Xi|Z ′iγ],
(Yi − Ê[Yi|Z ′iγ]) = (Xi − Ê[Xi|Z ′iγ])′β + ξ′i (13)
can be estimated by OLS, and Robinson’s estimator results as:
β̂ =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Xi − Ê[Xi|Z ′iγ]) · (Xi − Ê[Xi|Z ′iγ])′
)−1
(14)
·
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(Xi − Ê[Xi|Z ′iγ]) · (Yi − Ê[Yi|Z ′iγ])′
)
.
Ê[Yi|Ziγ] and Ê[Xi|Z ′iγ] are determined by a preceded nonlinear regression.20
Robinson shows his estimator to be
√
n-consistent and having an asymptotic
normal distribution as long as among other criteria independence of error terms
and regressors holds. Because of the application of nonparametric techniques this
estimator is affected by the Curse of Dimensionality21.
Intercept Estimators: Heckman (1990)
As seen in figure 1, Newey’s estimator needs an additional intercept estimator.
The same applies for Robinson’s approach. The estimation of an intercept is
essential for the identification of treatment effects. The basic idea of Heckman’s
(1990) procedure is the monotone increase of the funding probability with in-
creasing values: θ(Z ′iγ) = Z
′
iγ. This means, that observations with high index
values are funded with a probability close to 1. For those firms there is (almost)
19See Robinson (1988).
20This study applies Cleveland’s (1979) robust local linear estimator, that is easy to imple-
ment in STATA. To reduce the bias with a faster rate a tricubic weighting function is used. A
bandwidth of 0.8 is chosen. To choose an optimal bandwidth is difficult in this context, because
it is highly unlikely that the optimal bandwidths would be the same for both subsamples.
21The so called Curse of Dimensionality comes into effect, if the rate of convergency declines
with growing dimension of the regression vector, i.e. the higher the dimension of X, the more
observations are necessary to estimate the non-parametric component.
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no selection bias. The error terms of both equations of the model are indepen-
dent and average out at zero. The selection bias ϕi(θ(Z
′
iγ)) = E[εi|Xi, Z ′iγ, di =
1] = E[εi|Xi, Z ′iγ] = 0, because Z ′iγ implies di = 1 for the highest index values.
A certain threshold value b has to be chosen that determines when the firms’
probability to receive public R&D funding equals (almost) 1.22 For observations
with an index value above the threshold, the intercept estimator is calculated as
follows:
β̂H0 =
n∑
i=1
(Yi −X ′iβ̂) · I(Z ′iγ̂ > b)
n∑
i=1
I(Z ′iγ̂ > b)
. (15)
If independence of the regressors and error terms can be assumed Heckman’s
estimator is consistent23 and asymptotically normally distributed.24
The obvious disadvantage of this estimator is that only a few observations are
used for identification, that are moreover difficult to distinguish from outliers.
A further handicap is that there exists no formal rule to determine an adequate
treshold value b.
Intercept Estimators: Andrews and Schafgans (1998)
This estimator is an enhancement of Heckman’s intercept estimator. Instead
of using a trimming threshold, a weighting function s(Z ′iγ̂ − b′) is used, that
gives observations with higher index values a higher weight. b′ is a smoothing
parameter. The estimator is:
β̂
A/S
0 =
n∑
i=1
(Yi −X ′iβ̂) · s(Z ′iγ̂ − b′)
n∑
i=1
s(Z ′iγ̂ − b′)
. (16)
Compared to Heckman’s estimator this one is more flexible and also consistent.
If independence of error terms and regressors holds, β̂ and γ̂ are
√
n-consistent
and asymptotically normally distributed and the index Z ′iγ̂ is unbounded from
above and provides sufficient distribution mass in the upper tail. This estimator
is also based on the “Identification at Infinity“ assumption, the smoothing pa-
rameter b′ must tend to infinity with growing sample size. Conditional on several
assumptions, this study uses
22Theoretically identification is just given for observations with infinite index values, their
probability of public funding is exactly one. See Chamberlain’s (1986) “Identification at Infin-
ity“.
23The identification at infinity criterion leads to a non-standard convergence rate (See Schaf-
gans and Zinde-Walsh (2000)).
24See Schafgans and Zinde-Walsh (2000) for the proof.
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s(Z ′iγ̂ − b′) =

0 , (Z ′iγ̂ − b′) ≤ 0
1− exp
(
− (Z
′
iγ̂ − b′)
b′ − (Z ′iγ̂ − b′)
)
, 0 < (Z ′iγ̂ − b′) < b′
1 , b′ < (Z ′iγ̂ − b′)
 , (17)
as Andrews and Schafgans (1998) suggest.
This intercept estimator bears the same disadvantages as Heckman’s ap-
proach: it uses only a subsample of the observations for identification and the
choice of the treshold value is arbitrary.
Treatment effect
Basing on this estimation the estimated treatment effect on the treated firms
(ETT) is calculated. Following Madalla (1983), the effect is determined by sub-
tracting the estimated R&D expenditure of publicly funded firms, which they
would have conducted if they had not received public R&D funding,25 from the
expected R&D expenditure of funded firms. The difference is augmeted by the
selection correction and corrected by the estimated intercepts. One holds:26
ETT =
1
N1
N1∑
i=1
(Ŷ1i − Ŷ0i − ϕ1i · (β̂0 − β̂1)). (18)
4 Empirical Results
The empirical part of the paper applies the estimators described in the previ-
ous section to analyze the effect of public R&D funding on the R&D expenditure
of firms in the German manufacturing sector.
In the first step, a probit model on the probability to receive direct funding for
R&D projects from the BMBF is estimated. The results are presented in Table
4 in Appendix B. It turns out that firm size has a strong impact on the funding
probability. The number of employees divided by 1000 has a significant impact.27
The solvency of firms affects the probability of the receipt of public R&D funding
in different ways depending on firm size. On one hand, the smallest firms are less
likely to receive public R&D funding, the worse (higher) their credit rating index
is. On the other hand, the firms corresponding to the highest quintile depending
on size are more likely to receive public R&D funding, if their credit rating is
bad. Larger firms are more promising to be successfull with their R&D projects.
The market share gives a hint that firms in more concentrated markets are more
25This value is calculated by predicting the counterfactual situation by using the regressors
of the funded firms and the coefficients of the nonfunded firms.
26See Madalla (1983, p. 262), equation (9.7).
27The relatively small coefficient is caused by the implementation of the credit rating index
in relation to firm size.
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likely to receive public funding. Concentrated markets are suspected to provide
a better environment for innovation activities, because there is less uncertainty.
Innovation activities in the past that are described by the R&D department and
the patent stock variables seem to be an important factor, because such firms
are often well equipped with R&D resources and a significant knowledge base.
Capital companies are more likely to receive public R&D funding. An explanation
can be that they are chosen as “winners“ due to their assumed better interanl
organization. Further, the probit estimation of the receipt of public R&D funding
shows that firms with a foreign parent company receive less often public R&D
funding in Germany. They are more likely to address their application to their
home countries. Exportintensive firms are more likely to receive public R&D
funding. This may reveal the state’s goal to support the firms’ ability to compete
on international markets. Firms located in the eastern part of Germany are more
likely to receive R&D funding, because these firms are wanted to catch up with
their Western German counterparts. The time and industry dummies have a
significant influence.
This results give a hint that the BMBF is adapting a “picking-the-winner“
principle: Large firms and firms that have been innovative in the past are more
likely to receive public R&D funding. Moreover, firms with a bad solvency are
better off if they are large and capital companies. That gives a hint that the
state encourages firms with the best chances. These results show that the state
acts on a “picking the winner“ principle favoring firms that are more promising
in conducting successful R&D projects.
In the second step, structural equations on firms’ R&D expenditure are esti-
mated taking the selection into account. In order to improve identification, some
variables are excluded from the structural equation. It is difficult to find good
exclusion restrictions provided by a database. The legal form and a foreign parent
company are not supposed to have an impact on firms’ R&D expenditure. The
R&D department dummy is excluded. This is an artificial exclusion restriction
with an impact on the correlation on the error terms of both equations, and there-
fore have an impact on the level of the resulting treatment effects. For further
identification purpose, the export behavior is measured by a dummy variable.
First, an OLS regression that treats the funding status of the firms as exoge-
neous is estimated to benchmark further results. Table 5 in Appendix B shows
the results. The dummy describing the receipt of public R&D funding is signifi-
cant with a relatively large coefficient of 0.40. The receipt of public R&D granting
increases firms’ R&D expenditure. Thus, at a first glance, there is no hint that
public R&D funding crowds out private R&D expenditure. As expected, larger
firms are expending disproportionately more funds on R&D. There are a lot of
possible explanations: Larger firms are more likely to overcome capital market
imperfection, they utilize economies of scope and economies of scale, they profit
from a more efficient organization structure and complementarities of their de-
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partments. The market share has a very small negative impact that is significant
at a 10% level. This may be a hint that higher concentrated markets have lower
R&D expenditure, because the effort on competitiveness is not that much, if
there are less business rivals. Innovative activities in the past correspond with a
large knowledge base and exert a strong positive impact on current R&D expen-
diture. The quadratic effect is negative indicating decreasing marginal increases
from a growing knowledge stock. The credit rating index has a negative impact
on large firms R&D expenditure. For large firms, that are expected to conduct
disproportionately more R&D projects, solvency matters. Age has a very small
negative impact. This suggests that younger firms have to spend more in R&D,
because they do not yet have a significant knowledge base and R&D equipment at
their disposal. As expected, exporters invest more in R&D. The need to compete
internationally affects R&D expenditure positively. Eastern German firms spend
less behind Western German firms. Not surprisingly, the industry dummies’ base
category, the food, beverage and tobacco industry, is the sector with the lowest
R&D expenditures.
The OLS regression shows distinct effects of the receipt of public R&D fund-
ing, firm size, innovative activities in the past measured by the patent stock, the
export activities of the firms and the dummy for Eastern German firms. Solvency
only matters for large firms.
The two-step models consider an endogenous funding status. This approach
is self-evident, because it is not plausible that funded firms are selected randomly.
The estimated probit model on the receipt of public R&D funding confirms this
selectivity. R&D expenditures are estimated separately for funded and nonfunded
firms. Results are shown in Tables 6 (funded firms) and 7 (nonfunded firms)
in Appendix B. The different rows present the results for the different applied
estimators, that are described in section 3. The specification is the same for
every structural equation. Time and industry dummies are still included, but
are not reported in the tables. The standard errors are bootstrapped with 100
replications to get the correct second-step standard errors.28
Looking at the funded firms, there are some differences to the results for the
whole sample. The innovative history does not have any impact. Perhaps this is
caused by the receipt of public R&D funding, that enables firms to cover their
R&D expenses. The receipt of the public R&D funds that are different amounts
for every firm, may adjust differences in R&D knowledge and R&D equipment
between the funded firms. For the funded firms, the effect of solvency is more
articulative than for the total sample. Large firms with a bad credit rating invest
less in R&D. Export activities have no impact on funded firms’ R&D expenditure.
That may be caused by the fact that there are only relatively few funded firms (60)
28Greene (1981) shows that the standard errors in a general two-step model of sample selection
can either be smaller or larger than the correct standard errors.
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that are non-exporters in the subsample of the funded firms. Further, the effect
of the firm’s age is more distinct. Younger firms have higher R&D expenditures
to build up a knowledge base and R&D resources. Eastern German firms are
lagged behind Western German firms even if they are funded. There is little
impact from time and industry dummies.
Looking at the results for nonfunded firms, there are again some differences
in the regressors compared to the estimation for the whole sample. The patent
stock has an impact on R&D expenditure of nonfunded firms. However, using
the bootstrapped standard errors, this result is not robust with reference to the
different estimators. Solvency does not affect R&D expenditure of nonfunded
firms. An explanation may be that nonfunded firms do not conduct additional
R&D projects, which they perhaps would have conducted if they had received
R&D funding. Thus, only a certain stock of most important R&D projects is
conducted. Further, size has again a strong impact, younger firms show larger
R&D expenditure, export acitivities have a strong impact and Eastern German
firms face lower R&D expenditure for funded and nonfunded firms.
To conclude, there are some robust results for funded, nonfunded firms, and
the total sample and some different outcomes. Looking at the robust results,
first, firm size has a disproportionate effect on R&D expenditure. The first Neo-
Schumpeterian hypothesis is supported. The argumentation is manifold, ranging
from size advantages in the presence of capital market imperfection, economies of
scale, economies of scope to complementarities of the departments. Second, East-
ern German firms face less in R&D expenditure. The Eastern Germany economy
has not finished its transformation into a market economy. One of the symptoms
are the lower R&D investments in Eastern Germany compared to those in the
western part. There is still a R&D investment gap. And third, younger firms
have larger R&D expenditure. Young firms are not able to revert on existing
R&D knowledge and resources what may cause their higher R&D expenditure.
Looking at the different results for funded and nonfunded firms, first, export ac-
tivities only have an impact on the R&D expenditures of the nonfunded firms.
A possible explanation can be that most of the funded firms are exporters. Sec-
ond, solvency does not matter for nonfunded firms, but for funded firms. Large,
funded firms with a bad credit rating have less R&D expenditures. They are
not able to conduct additional projects that they would have done if they would
have been in a better solvency situation. Third, the patent stock is significant
for nonfunded firms’ R&D expenditures. This result is not robust regarding the
different estimators. But it is plausible that nonfunded firms are more dependent
on R&D resources and knowledge in stock.
Selection matters in both subsamples. All selection correction terms in the
subsample of the nonfunded firms have significant coefficients. In the subsample
of the funded firms, some of Cosslett’s dummy selection correction terms are not
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significant. This is caused by the sample size. For the funded firms, there are
not enough observations in the lowest intervals, that correspond with firms that
have the lowest probabilities of receiving public R&D funding.
The Mill’s ratio is significant for funded and nonfunded firms. This selection
correction term bases on the “identification at infinity“ criterion: For funded
firms, the Mill’s ratio converges to infinity with increasing probability of re-
ceiving public R&D funding. For small probabilities of receiving public R&D
funding, there is the largest (downwards) selection correction. In the subsample
of nonfunded firms analogous: For decreasing probability to receive public R&D
funding, the Mill’s ratio converges to infinity, and for firms with a high proba-
bility of receiving public R&D funding, there is the largest (upwards) selection
correction.
Newey’s (1999) selection correction method uses polynomial series correction
terms with a heuristically chosen number of selection correction terms. This se-
lection correction provides the advantage to be a bounded function in between -1
and 1 and therewith, this selection correction is more robust to outliers than the
Mill’s ratio. The first polynomial is significant and positive in the subsample of
the funded firms. This provides an upwards selection for the firms with the high-
est probability of receiving public R&D funding and a downwards selection for
the firms at the other egde of the propensity score. For the nonfunded firms the
selection correction is inverse. The quadratic selection correction term is negative
and significant in both subsamples. This equals an upwards correction for ob-
servations with middle-value propensity scores. In total, the selection correction
of the funded-firms reveals the figure of the Mill’s Ratio within the bounds. For
the nonfunded firms, the selection correction describes a line for the observations
with the lowest propensity scores comparable to the Mill’s Ratio. For the middle
values, there is a small bump, but the strong rise of the Mill’s Ratio’s selection
correction for the highest propensity score values is not certified by this more
flexible selection terms.
Cosslett’s (1991) estimator uses a dummy variables selection correction based
on the partitioned probit index. In this application the number of 10 intervals
is chosen heuristically with each interval covering the same number of observa-
tions.29 The first interval, int 1, covers the observations with the lowest probabil-
ity of receiving public R&D funding; the last interval, int 10, the firms, that are
most likely to receive public R&D funding. Firms that are most likely to receive
R&D funding, int 10, are taken as base category to avoid singularity. For the
funded firms, only four of the selection correction dummies are significant. This
makes sense, because there are not many observations in some of the intervals
29Cosslett (1983) provides a distribution free ML estimator to find an endogenous number of
intervals. Applying the algorithm due to Ayer et al. (1955), which is also the starting point of
Cosslett’s (1983) ML estimator, just in order to find an endogenous number of intervals I came
up with a too large number of 24 intervals, especially for estimations using the funded firms’
subsample.
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for firms with a low probability of receiving public R&D funding. The selection
correction terms for the nonfunded firms provide a more articulative figure. Due
to the sample size most of the selection correction dummies are significant.
Robinson’s estimator substracts the R&D expenditure by their statistical ex-
pectation and thereby eliminates the selection bias.
A focus of this study are the resulting treatment effects of public direct R&D
project funding on funded firms’ R&D expenditure. Following Madalla the treat-
ment effetct is calculated as (18). If the treatment effects are significantly larger
than zero, direct project funding has a positive effect on R&D expenditure. This
hypothesis can be tested by an ordinary t-test. If the treatment effect is not
statistically significant, there is no evidence of an impact of public funding pro-
grams. Table 2 shows the calculated effects. To calculate the treatment effect
for Newey’s (1999) and Robinson’s (1988) estimator an additional intercept esti-
mator is needed. Heckman’s (1990) and Andrews’ & Schafgans’ (1998) intercept
estimators are used. There is no rule to chose the treshold values that determine
the number of observations used for identification. This study uses 10% of the
observations.
Table 2: Treatment effects
ETT
OLS 0.40***
Heckman 0.64***
Cosslett 0.52***
Newey (Heckm.) 0.23***
Newey (And./Schafg.) 0.21***
Robinson (Heckm.) 0.07***
Robinson (And./Schafg.) 0.12***
*** significance at the 1% level
All estimated models provide a positive impact of public R&D granting on
firms’ R&D expenditure. The magnitude of this effect varies with the applied
model and varies with the applied intercept estimator. There are very few ob-
servations with a very high and a very low estimated probability of receiving
public R&D funding. So identification of the intercept is not optimal. The differ-
ences attributed to the different models result from the different modeling of the
propensity score. Heckman’s model uses the Mill’s Ratio that ranges from zero
to minus or plus infinity. Thereby, a great variation of the values is allowed. In
Cosslett’s model the variation is comparable. Table 2 shows the largest treatment
effects for those models. Newey’s approach uses a bounded selection correction.
The boundedness of the index values leads to the smaller treatment effect. In the
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case of Robinson’s estimator, variation is nearly completely eliminated by taking
the differences between the observed values and the mean value. In this context,
Robinson’s approach seems to be not the best choice, if one is interested in the
treatment effects.
To conclude, it is important to note that all calculated estimated treatment
effects are statistically significant. Public direct R&D project funding stimulates
firms’ R&D expenditure. The OLS model and those two-step selection models,
that allow a large index variation, provide large treatment effects on the treated.
The semiparametric models with a small index variation provide a statistically
significant, but smaller treatment effect. The intercept estimators account for a
small part of the different treatment effects, because they are basing on a small
subsample, that is used for identification.
5 Conclusions
The evaluation of public R&D funding is an important question in the indus-
trial economic literature. This paper focuses on public grants for R&D projects
in the German manufacturing sector. The econometric methods are two-step
selection models. Most important variables are firm size, the firms’ innovative
activities in the past, and a regional dummy for Eastern German firms. Fur-
thermore, it is controlled for industry effects. A very strong impact on the R&D
expenditure and the receipt of public R&D funding stems from the firm size and
the location of the firm (Eastern vs. Western Germany). Looking at funded
and nonfunded firms separately, it turns out that there are some differences, e.g.
export activities do not matter for the R&D expenditure of funded firms which
is the contrary for nonfunded firms and the solvency situation has no impact on
the R&D expenditure of nonfunded firms.
This study applies parametric and semi-parametric two-step selection models
in the context of an industrial economic evaluation question. It becomes appar-
ent that the model specification is fairly robust regarding the different two-step
models. A further interest of the paper is the treatment effects on the treated
firms: Does public project funding stimulate or crowd out private R&D expen-
diture? The resulting estimated treatment effects on the treated are statistically
significant and positive for all applied models. Therefore, they are in line with
previous studies in a similar context for Germany.30 A comparison of the re-
sulting treatment effects from different models shows that the magnitude of the
treatment effect varies with the applied model and the applied intercept estima-
tor. OLS and also the two-step selection models that allow the greatest variation
in their selection correction term, provide the largest treatment effect. The two-
step models with the minor variation of their selection terms provide small, but
still significant treatment effects. Models with very low variation seem to be not
30See Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) or Czarnitzki and Fier (2002, 2003).
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adequate in this context.
In this study the amount of public R&D funding is indirectly taken into
account by focusing the net R&D expenditure. Subject to further research is the
analysis of the amount of public R&D funding that firms receive.
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Appendix A
Table 3: Classification of Industry Dummies
Dummy Description NACE
ind1 Food, beverage and tobacco 15
ind2 Textile, clothes and leather goods 17, 18, 19
ind3 Wood, paper, publishing, printing, furniture, jewellery, 20, 21, 22, 36
musical and sport instruments, toys and others
ind4 Fuels and chemicals 23, 24
ind5 Rubber and plastic products 25
ind6 Non-metallic mineral products 26
ind7 Basic metals 27
ind8 Fabricated metals 28
ind9 Machinery and equipment 29
ind10 Electrical machinery and components 31
ind11 Office, data processing and communication equipment 30, 32
ind12 Medical, optical instruments and watches 33
ind13 Motor vehicles and components 34
ind14 Other transports 35
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Appendix B
Table 4: Probit model on the receipt of public funding
variable coef. std. error
emp./1000 0.06*** 0.01
(emp./1000)2 0.00*** 0.00
(crd.rat.)q1 -1.57*** 0.58
(crd.rat.)q2 0.50 0.53
(crd.rat.)q3 0.30 0.55
(crd.rat.)q4 1.34** 0.60
(crd.rat.)q5 2.97*** 0.61
age 0.51** 0.24
(age)2 0.00 0.00
share 0.02** 0.01
R&D dep. 0.27*** 0.07
patent stock 5.13*** 0.79
(patent stock)2 -6.13*** 1.32
capital company 0.36** 0.14
foreign parent comp. -0.49*** 0.11
export intensity 0.44*** 0.13
East Germany 1.27*** 0.09
1992 -0.59*** 0.11
1993 -0.48*** 0.11
1994 -0.29*** 0.11
1995 -0.44*** 0.12
1996 -0.50*** 0.12
1997 -0.16 0.17
1998 -0.34*** 0.12
1999 -0.54*** 0.12
ind2 0.23 0.26
ind3 0.01 0.22
ind4 0.43** 0.20
ind5 0.12 0.22
ind6 0.66*** 0.23
ind7 0,82*** 0.23
ind8 0,14 0.21
ind9 0,71*** 0.19
ind10 0,67*** 0.21
ind11 1,37*** 0.21
ind12 1,21*** 0.20
ind13 0,23 0.23
ind14 1.47*** 0.24
cons -2.44*** 0.28
num. of obs. 3744
LR chi2 930.02
Pseudo R2 0.25
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level.
26
Table 5: OLS estimation on firms’ R&D expenditure
variable coef. std. error
public funding 0.40*** 0.06
log(emp.) 0.54*** 0.09
log2emp.) 0.05*** 0.01
(crd.rat.)q1 0.38 0.57
(crd.rat.)q2 -0.20 0.42
(crd.rat.)q3 -0.85** 0.43
(crd.rat.)q4 -0.33 0.50
(crd.rat.)q5 -1.20** 0.58
share -0.00* 0.00
age -0.01*** 0.00
(age)2 0.00*** 0.00
patent stock 5.20*** 0.74
(patent stock)2 -3.99*** 1.36
export dummy 0.26*** 0.08
East Germany -0.20*** 0.07
1992 -0.13 0.09
1993 0.01 0.09
1994 -0.02 0.09
1995 0.12 0.09
1996 -0.39*** 0.09
1997 -0.83 0.12
1998 0.18** 0.09
1999 -0.17* 0.10
ind2 0.26 0.19
ind3 0.22 0.15
ind4 1.49*** 0.15
ind5 0.36** 0.15
ind6 0.38** 0.17
ind7 0.44*** 0.17
ind8 0.25* 0.14
ind9 0.90*** 0.13
ind10 0.85*** 0.15
ind11 1.67*** 0.17
ind12 1.50*** 0.15
ind13 0.76*** 0.16
ind14 1.27*** 0.22
cons -6.42*** 0.35
num. of obs. 3744
F-stat. 244.12
R2 0,69
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level.
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Table 6: Two-step estimation on funded firms’ R&D expenditure
Heckman Newey Cosslett Robinson
variable coef. coef. coef. coef.
std. error std. error std. error std. error
Mill’s ratio -0.89***
(0.29)
Newey 1.33***
(0.30)
(Newey)2 -0.42*
(0.22)
int1 -0.48
(0.60)
int2 -0.77
(0.59)
int3 0.32
(0.47)
int4 -0.14
(0.31)
int5 -0.66**
(0.27)
int6 -0.32
(0.21)
int7 -0.75***
(0.25)
int8 -0.67***
(0.25)
int9 -0.45***
(0.16)
log(emp.) 0.87*** 1.02*** 0.78*** 0.85***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.23) (0.27)
log2(emp.) 0.02 0.00 0.03*** 0.02**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
(crd.rat.)q1 2.49 3.10* 2.16 2.25
(1.56) (1.66) (1.75) (1.62)
(crd.rat.)q2 0.77 0.79 0.92 0.69
(0.87) (0.80) (1.00) (0.92)
(crd.rat.)q3 -2.02** -2.42** -1.71* -2.11**
(0.86) (0.88) (0.98) (0.95)
(crd.rat.)q4 -2.43*** -2.82*** -1.87** -2.24***
(0.81) (0.95) (0.85) (0.82)
(crd.rat.)q5 -3.50*** -4.24*** -2.55** -3.20***
(1.08) (1.16) (1.14) (1.13)
share -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
age -1.42*** -1.63*** -1.35*** -1.37***
(0.40) (0.47) (0.46) (0.44)
(age)2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
patent stock 1.21 -0.44 2.96 1.96
(1.48) (1.53) (1.24) (1.28)
(patent stock)2 0.91 2.92 -1.16 0.09
(1.89) (2.12) (1.96) (1.89)
export dummy 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.02
(0.22) (0.25) (0.25) (0.19)
East Germany -1.03*** -1.40*** -0.69*** -0.83***
(0.32) (0.28) (0.20) (0.20)
cons -4.61*** -5.04*** -5.72*** 0.01
(1.17) (1.02) (0.96) (0.05)
num. of obs. 723 723 723 723
F-stat. 99.59 97.94 87.13 51.39
R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.72
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level.
13 industry and 8 time dummies are included, but not reported.
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Table 7: Two-step estimation on nonfunded firms’ R&D expenditure
Heckman Newey Cosslett Robinson
variable coef. coef. coef. coef.
std. error std. error std. error std. error
Mill’s ratio -1.28***
(0.29)
Newey -0.64***
(0.24)
(Newey)2 -0.92***
(0.21)
int1 -1.88***
(0.24)
int2 -1.50***
(0.20)
int3 -1.39***
(0.18)
int4 -1.19***
(0.17)
int5 -1.08***
(0.15)
int6 -0.92***
(0.15)
int7 -0.74***
(0.13)
int8 -0.58***
(0.12)
int9 -0,37***
(0.13)
log(emp.) 0.62*** 0.57*** 0.54*** 0.52***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10)
log2(emp.) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
(crd.rat.)q1 0.62 0.89 1.13 0.63
(0.60) (0.55) (0.60) (0.48)
(crd.rat.)q2 -0.18 -0.04 0.16 -0.05
(0.52) (0.45) (0.51) (0.57)
(crd.rat.)q3 -0.50 -0.52 -0.41 -0.26
(0.53) (0.52) (0.50) (0.52)
(crd.rat.)q4 0.11 -0.16 -0.19 0.35
(0.67) (0.57) (0.66) (0.66)
(crd.rat.)q5 -1.22 -1.91 -1.87 -0.80
(0.85) (0.85) (0.85) (0.75)
share -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
age -0.73*** -0.84*** -0.96*** -0.75***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.20) (0.16)
(age)2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
patent stock 2.89** 1.70 1.29 3.64***
(1.13) (1.13) (0.96) (0.96)
(patent stock)2 -1.50 0.01 0.69 -2.12
(2.22) (2.02) (2.02) (2.02)
export dummy 0.21*** 0.19** 0.17** 0.23***
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
East Germany -0.72*** -0.97*** -1.14*** -0.61***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
cons -6.60*** -4.98*** -4.81*** 0.00
(0.37) (0.39) (0.36) (0.02)
num. of obs. 3021 3021 3021 3021
F-stat. 126.75 129.61 113.64 102.70
R2 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.55
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level.
13 industry and 8 time dummies are included, but not reported.
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